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The European Community between Social Policy 
and Social Regulation
Giandomenico Majone, European University Institute
1. The several dimensions of Europe's "social dimension" 
Community policymakers but also many scholars speak of the 
"social dimension" of European integration as if the 
expression were sufficiently precise to be operationally or 
analytically useful. In fact, the expression is ambiguous 
since it encompasses a number of distinct and partly 
conflicting dimensions. For this reason opinions about the 
present state and future prospects of social Europe range 
from cautious optimism to outright pessimism.
There is considerable ambiguity about the meaning of a 
European social policy in the Treaty of Rome itself. The 
section on social policy —  Title III of Part Three of the 
Treaty —  enumerates a number of "social fields" (employment; 
labour law and working conditions; vocational training; 
social security; occupational health and safety; collective 
bargaining and right of association) where member states 
should closely cooperate (Art. 118, EEC). In the following 
Article, Member States are urged to "maintain the application 
of the principle that men and women should receive equal pay
Paper presented at the 1992 Annual Meeting of the 
APSA, Panel 25-1: Will the "New Europe" be a Regulatory 
State? Chicago 3-6, 1992 and to be published in Journal of 




























































































for equal work". The same Title III also establishes the 
European Social Fund with the goal of improving employment 
opportunities and facilitating the geographical and 
occupational mobility of workers.
What is arguably the most significant social policy 
provision of the Rome Treaty —  the social security regime 
for migrant workers —  appears not in the section on social 
policy but in the one on the free movement of persons, 
services and
capital (Title III of Part Two, Art. 51, EEC). Finally, one 
of the objectives of the common agricultural policy is, 
according to Art. 39(b) of the Treaty, "to ensure a fair 
standard of living for the agricultural community, in 
particular by increasing the individual earnings of persons 
engaged in agriculture".
Thus, to the framers of the Treaty "social policy" 
included not only social security and interpersonal 
distribution of income, at least for certain groups of 
workers, but also interregional redistribution, elements of 
industrial and labour market policy (vocational training, 
measures to improve labour mobility) and social regulation 
(primarily occupational health and safety, and equal 
treatment for men and women).
However, the enumeration of matters relating to the 
social field in Art.118 and the limited role given to the EC 



























































































policies, to make studies, deliver opinions and arrange 
consultations - indicate that the social policy domain, with 
the exceptions noted above, was originally considered to be 
outside the supranational competence of the institutions of 
the Community (Vogel-Polski and Vogel, 1991). In fact, 
Commission activity in the area of social policy and social 
regulation was quite modest between 1958 and the end of the 
1970s, with one notable exception: environmental policy. The 
terms "environment" or "environmental protection" do not even 
appear in the Treaty of Rome. Despite the lack of an explicit 
legal basis, a Community environmental policy has been 
growing vigorously, even if not harmoniously or 
systematically, since 1967. The significance of this 
development will become clear as we proceed with our 
argument.
The Single European Act (SEA) of 1986, assigns a number 
of new competences to the Community in the social field. The 
main lines of development of Community activities in this 
field are beginning to clearly emerge: they are regional 
development (new Title V, Economic and Social Cohesion), and 
social regulation (Art. 100A, Art. 118A, and the new Title 
VII, Environment). As noted above, prior to this the social 
policy belonged to the competence of the Member States with 
the power of initiative of the Commission essentially limited 
to promoting collaboration among those Member States. In 




























































































Community the power to regulate in the field of occupational 
health and safety. Hence the first directives in this area 
had to be based on Art. 100 (which deals with the 
approximation of laws directly affecting the functioning of 
the common market) and thus needed unanimity in the Council 
of Ministers. Under the new Art. 118A, directives in the 
field of occupational health and safety can be adopted by the 
Council by qualified majority and without the need of proving 
that they are requisite to the completion of the internal market.
Another innovation introduced by Art. 118A is the 
concept of the "working environment", which makes possible 
regulatory interventions beyond the traditional limits of 
health and safety at the workplace. Under the wide 
interpretation favoured by the European Parliament, the 
objective of improving the working environment would include 
all conditions which may affect the health and safety of 
workers: organization of the labour market, length of work, 
its organization and nature, as well as physical and 
psychological stress. Although such a broad interpretation is 
opposed by both the Council and the Commission, some recent 
directives (to be discussed in more detail in section 4) go 
beyond existing regulations in most Member States in taking 
into consideration ergonomic and other "soft" factors, within 
the spirit of Art. 118A.
To complete this picture of significant progress in 




























































































mention of Art. 100(3) which states that the Commission will 
start from a high level of protection in matters relating to 
health, safety, and environmental and consumer protection. 
This implies that the reference to minimum requirements in 
Art. 118A ("the Council ... shall adopt, by means of 
directives, minimum requirements for gradual implementation, 
having regard to the conditions and technical rules obtaining 
in each of the Member States") does not mean that Community 
health and safety standards should reflect the lowest level 
prevailing in the Member States. Rather, Community standards 
represent a lower threshold for national regulators who are 
free to maintain or adopt standards incorporating higher 
levels of safety.
The increasing importance of social regulation is also 
revealed by the action programme implementing the Community 
Social Charter adopted by the Member States, with the 
exception of the United Kingdom, on 9 December, 1989. Of the 
20 directives/regulations listed in the programme, 10 are in 
the area of occupational health and safety, 3 deal with 
improvements in living and working conditions, 3 with equal 
treatment for men and women, disabled persons, and protection 
of children (COM (89) 568 final).
The Treaty of Maastricht confirms this trend. It 
contains a new section on consumer protection (Title XVIII); 
it introduces significant innovations in the area of 




























































































majority voting for most environmental protection measures. 
It even adds transportation safety to the regulatory tasks of 
the Community (Art.75, 1(C)). But the Treaty is silent about 
most areas of traditional social policy.
These developments show that EC policies in the social 
field are evolving along quite different lines from those 
followed by the Member States. National historical traditions 
have yielded a dense web of welfare institutions covering 
most citizens "from cradle to grave", while the Community 
remains, and will very likely remain, a "welfare laggard". In 
the field of social regulation, however, the progress has 
been so remarkable that some recent EC directives surpass 
the most advanced national measures in the level of 
protection they afford. The aim of this paper is to clarify 
the reasons for these divergent patterns of policy 
development, thus providing a more accurate picture of the 
social Europe of the future.
2. What makes social regulation different
Since passage of the SEA an increasing number of EC 
directives dealing with quality-of-life issues no longer need 
to be justified by reference to the completion of the 
internal market. In this sense, social regulation has 
succeeded in acquiring a measure of autonomy with respect to 




























































































justified in functional terms, measures proposed by the 
Commission in the social field must be compatible with the 
"economic constitution" of the Community, that is, with the 
principles of a liberal economic order. This requirement 
creates an ideological climate quite unlike the one which 
made possible the development of the welfare state in the 
Member States.
At least until the late 1970s, few students and 
practitioners of social policy in Europe bothered to inquire 
whether the measures they advocated were in fact compatible 
with the logic of a competitive market economy. The English 
sociologist T.H.Marshall gave expression to widespread and 
long-held views, when he wrote that "social policy uses 
political power to supersede, supplement or modify operations 
of the economic system in order to achieve results which the 
economic system would not achieve on its own, and ... in 
doing so it is guided by values other than those determined 
by open market forces" (Marshall, 1975: 15).
Community social policy could not be justified in such 
terms. The economic liberalism that pervades the founding 
Treaty and its subsequent revisions gives priority to the 
allocation function of public policy over distributional 
objectives. Hence the best rationale for social initiatives 
at Community level is one which stresses the efficiency­
improving aspects of the proposed measures. Welfare economics 




























































































fundamental theorem of welfare economics states that under 
certain conditions, competitive markets lead to a Pareto- 
optimal allocation of resources, that is, to a situation 
where there is no rearrangement of resources (no possible 
change in production and consumption) such that someone can 
be made better off without, at the same time, making someone 
else worse off. Theoretical research in economics during the 
past few decades has identified six important conditions 
under which the market is not Pareto efficient (Stiglitz, 
1988). These are referred to as "market failures". They 
provide a set of rationales for government interventions 
acceptable, in principle, even to the advocates of a liberal 
economic order. They are:





6. Unemployment, inflation and disequilibrium.
Two further rationales for government intervention not 
related to market failure are:
7. Redistribution;
8. Merit goods.
These eight reasons fall into three groups which 
correspond to the three fiscal functions of government in the 




























































































stabilization function (6) and the distribution function (7 
and 8). Thus an analytic distinction between social 
regulation and social policy may be drawn on the basis of the 
rationales for government intervention. Social regulation 
(health and safety, environment, consumer protection) 
attempts to solve problems created by specific types of 
market failure —  especially, public goods, negative 
externalities and information failures. Air and water 
pollution are prime examples of externalities, while a number 
of regulatory activities in the fields of safety and consumer 
protection are motivated by imperfect information and the 
belief that the market, by itself, will supply too little 
information. Examples are regulations requiring lenders to 
inform borrowers of the true rate of interest on their loans, 
regulations concerning labeling of food or medicinal 
products, disclosure of contents, etc.. To the extent that 
such regulations succeed in correcting the market failure 
they address, they not only increase consumer welfare but, as 
a consequence, also improve market efficiency.
If there are no market failures the economy is Pareto 
efficient and there is no economic justification for 
government intervention. But the fact that the economy is 
Pareto efficient says nothing about the distribution of 
income. A very unequal distribution of income may be 




























































































legitimize government intervention on political and moral 
grounds, even at some loss in economic efficiency.
The second argument for government intervention in a 
Pareto-efficient economy arises from concern that individuals 
may not act in their own best interest. Goods that the 
government compels individuals to consume, like elementary 
education and low-cost housing for the poor (instead of 
giving cash grants), are called merit goods■ Of course, the 
paternalistic argument is plausible only if one assumes that 
government knows what is in the best interest of individuals 
better than they themselves do. It is important to note that 
the paternalistic argument for government activities is quite 
distinct from the externalities argument (Stiglitz, 1988:81). 
Smoking in public places imposes a cost on non-smokers and 
hence a ban can be justified by an externalities argument. 
Those who take a paternalistic view might argue that 
individuals should not be allowed to smoke even in the 
privacy of their homes and even if a tax, which makes the 
smokers take account of the external costs they impose on 
others, is levied.
While "social policy" is not a technical term with exact 
and uniform meaning, there is general agreement that its 
central core consists of social insurance, public assistance, 
the health and welfare services, housing policy. Richard 
Titmuss has identified three main models of social policy: 



























































































come into play only when an individual' s needs are not 
adequately met by the private market and the family; the 
industrial achievement-performance model —  social needs 
should be met on the basis of merit, work performance and 
productivity; and the institutional redistributive models —  
social policy should provide universalistic services outside 
the market on the principle of need (Titmuss, 1974: 30-31).
It should be clear from the preceding discussion that 
all three models of social policy, but especially the third 
one, are quite different from social regulation both in the 
range of government activities they include and in their 
underlying rationale: public goods, negative externalities 
and information failure in one case, redistribution and merit 
goods in the other. Of course, the distinction is not 
absolute. Thus, merit goods play a limited role also in 
social regulation, e.g., protective equipment for workers or 
seat belts for drivers. Even in these cases, however, the 
justifications tend to be different. For example, it is 
argued that, given incomplete consumer information, 
temporarily imposed consumer choice may be desirable as part 
of a learning process, so as to permit more intelligent free 
cho ice thereaf ter.
Naturally, market failures are not the only 
justifications for social regulation. There are important 
instances where there is widespread agreement that the 





























































































within a broader range of social objectives. Community 
legislation on equal opportunity in employment for men and 
women is an example. Although regulatory interventions to 
protect "non-commodity values" (Stewart, 1983) like equal 
opportunity and civil rights cannot be justified in terms of 
welfare economics, they reveal another dimension of the 
distinction between traditional social policy and the new 
social regulation. The social policies of industrialized 
countries are the result of the social struggles of the past 
and reflect the values of societies in which the central 
issue was the distribution of the domestic product. Social 
regulation, both at the national and Community level, 
addresses primarily quality-of-life issues, and thus reflects 
the values and political culture of post-industrial 
societies.
Analytically distinct, social policy and social 
regulation are historically and institutionally related; they 
belong to the same "policy space". A policy space being a set 
of policies that are so interconnected that it is impossible 
to make useful descriptive or analytic statements about one 
of the policies without taking the other elements of the set 
into consideration (Majone, 1989a: 158-61).
£  The most interesting aspect of a policy space is how its 
internal structure changes in time. As the number and 
importance of some elements grow relative to the size of the 




























































































political resources devoted to it), individual policies 
increasingly compete with each other for public support. Some 
policies may become so important that they form a distinct 
subspace within the original space. This is how social 
regulation has evolved within the social-policy space - a 
development most students of social policy have failed to 
notice because of their fixation on particular programmes and 
institutional arrangements. In thinking about the future 
shape of a European "social state", it is important to pay 
attention to the dynamics of the entire social-policy space. 
Nowadays quality of life depends at least as much on 
environmental and consumer protection as on traditional 
instruments of social policy (Kaufmann, 1985).
3. The infeasibilitv of a European welfare state
The idea of a European welfare state somehow emerging as a 
"transnational synthesis" (Offe, 1990:8) of national welfare 
systems has been discussed repeatedly in recent years. The 
advocates of this idea are generally motivated by a 
historical analogy, but particularly by concerns about the 
future of social entitlements in an integrated European 
market.
The analogy is with the integrative role of social 
policy in the formation of the nation state in XIXth century 




























































































contribution to the process of nation building by bridging 
the gap between state and society. National insurance, social 
security, public education, socialized medicine were, and to 
a large extent remain, powerful symbols of national 
solidarity. It is argued that a supranational welfare state 
would provide an equally strong demonstration of Europe-wide 
solidarity (Streeck, 1990; Offe, 1990; Leibfried, 1991; 
Leibfried and Pierson, forthcoming).
However, the very success of the national welfare state 
sets limits to an expanded social policy competence of the 
Community. Indeed, there is a striking difference between the
I scale and scope of national policies and the modest role of 
(traditional) social policy in the process of European 
integration. It is also possible that the development of 
welfare-state institutions at Community level, instead of 
generating a sense of supranational solidarity would 
reinforce popular feelings against centralization, 
bureaucratization and technocratic management. Finally, it 
should be remembered that, in Germany and elsewhere, 
acceptance of the social state by the entrepreneurs was 
bought with the promise of protection against foreign 
competition by tariffs and other means (De Swaan, 1988). Such 
a bargain would be hardly possible under present 
circumstances.
If the historical analogy is dubious, how well founded 




























































































welfare regimes in an integrated market would lead to regime 
shopping, social dumping and deregulation? To answer such a 
question one must rely on indirect empirical evidence. The 
level and direction of foreign investments in developing 
countries, for example, seem to indicate that firms do not 
invest in low social wage countries unless other factors like 
infrastructure and worker productivity justify such 
investments (Knodgen, 1979). High social wage countries like 
Germany continue to attract foreign investments precisely 
because of the advantages they offer in terms of superior 
infrastructure and high worker productivity. In fact, the 
ambiguous social consequences of integration "are revealed by 
the fact that northern Europe's concerns about "sunbelt 
effects" are mirrored by Southern Europe's concerns about 
"agglomeration effects" in which investment would flow 
towards the superior infrastructures and high-skilled 
workforces of Europe's most developed regions" (Leibfried and 
Pierson, forthcoming: 26).
Even in the United States well developed welfare 
regimes, like Wisconsin's or California's, coexist with more 
primitive ones. For example, California provided welfare 
recipients in 1990 with benefits nearly six times as large as 
those provided by Alabama. The maximum welfare benefit paid 
to a California family of three was $694 a month, compared 
with $118 paid to a similar family in Alabama (Peterson and 





























































































differences among the states are not just the peculiarities 
of a few states, nor are they gradually disappearing. 
Instead, the statistics show that benefits varied as much in 
1990 as they did in 1940. Such disparities give rise to the 
phenomenon of "welfare magnets" - states with comparatively 
high benefits that attract the poor. However, because of 
linguistic and cultural barriers, and an increasing standard 
of living even in the poorer regions of the Community, this 
is not likely to become a problem in Europe, even after the 
completion of the internal market. If one also keeps in mind 
the relatively high level of Community standards of health 
and safety, it appears that fears of an erosion of the 
national welfare state as a consequence of European 
integration are exaggerated. If there is a crisis of the 
welfare state - a question about which opinions widely 
diverge - this is because of factors which have nothing to do 
with the process of integration: demographic trends, the 
mounting costs of health care, the world crisis in social 
security, taxpayers' revolts, excessive bureaucratization, 
and so on.
It is fortunate that the normative case for a European 
welfare state is not compelling, for the practical prospects 
are extremely poor. To begin with the most obvious 
difficulty, the Community does not have, and will not have in 
the foreseeable future, anything approaching the financial 




























































































amounts to about 1.2 percent of the total GDP of the Member 
States and to less than 4 percent of the central government 
spending of these countries (average government spending in 
OECD countries is 40 percent of GDP). The Common Agriculture 
Policy absorbs almost 70 percent of the budget; what remains 
is clearly insufficient to support a Community-wide social 
policy, even on a modest scale. It should be noted, however, 
that such limited resources are sufficient to set up 
ambitious programmes in social (and economic) regulation. In 
fact, an important characteristic of regulatory policymaking 
is the limited influence of budgetary limitations on the 
activities of regulators. The size of non-regulatory, direct- 
expenditure programmes is constrained by budgetary 
appropriations and, ultimately, by the size of government tax 
revenues. In contrast, the costs of most regulatory 
programmes are borne directly by the firms and individuals 
who have to comply with them. Compared to these costs, the 
resources needed to produce the regulations are trivial. This 
general feature of regulatory policymaking is even more 
pronounced in the case of the Community, since not only the 
economic, but also the political and administrative costs of 
enforcing EC regulations are borne by Member States (Majone, 
1989b, 1991).
A second problem is the variety of welfare-state forms 
existing in Europe. At least four main types have been 




























































































model of the "Bismarck countries", and the welfare systems of 
the countries of the southern rim of the Community 
(Leibfried, 1991). Each of these models and their numerous 
variants are rooted in peculiar historical and political 
traditions, and are deeply embedded in different socio­
economic contexts. Any attempt to harmonize such varied 
systems is bound to fail, as EC policymakers clearly 
understand. Title XV of the Treaty of Maastricht explicitly 
excludes any harmonization of the laws and regulations of the 
Member States in the field of health policy. The 1989 Action 
Programme implementing the Community Social Charter (COM (89) 
568 final) has this to say on social security:
The social security schemes vary greatly 
in nature from one Member State of the 
Community to another. They reflect the 
history, traditions and social and 
cultural practices proper to each Member 
State, which cannot be called into 
question. There can therefore be no 
question of harmonizing the systems 
existing in these fields.
For the same reasons, a well-known scholar has suggested 
that instead of aiming at supranationalism in the field of 
social policy, it would be better for the members of the EC 
to work within the framework offered by the Social Charter of 
the Council of Europe. A more flexible and less constraining 
approach based on multilateral agreements would provide an 
oppportunity to learn from the best national experiences and 





























































































It could be argued that if a fully-fledged European 
welfare state is, at present, politically infeasible, it 
should at least be possible to develop certain of its 
elements. At a later stage these elements could be fitted 
together to obtain a comprehensive regime. Thus, the Common 
Agricultural Policy effects a considerable transfer of money 
from consumers and taxpayers to farmers, and in this sense it 
might be considered part of a "welfare state for farmers" 
(Leibfried and Pierson, forthcoming). However, the CAP 
represents not only an inefficient, but also a perverse type 
of social policy since it favours the well-to-do farmers of 
northern and central Europe rather than the poor hill farmers 
of the South. Only if the current system of price support is 
transformed to a direct income grant, will agricultural 
policy become a true social policy, though limited to a 
particular occupational group.
Another potential candidate is the social security 
regime for migrant workers. An interesting proposal in this 
area has been made by Danny Pieters (1991). The proposal 
attempts to go beyond mere coordination by creating a 
European Social Security System (ESSS) for migrant workers. 
The system would be optional: migrant workers could choose 
between the present framework of coordination and the 
possibility of an automatic transfer from the national system 
to ESSS. This is an imaginative application of Article 51 




























































































represent, if implemented, a first step in the direction of 
a comprehensive European welfare state. The historical 
development of the Community has shown again and again the 
limits of such functionalist logic.
Even if Member States were to endorse the plan, they 
would most likely oppose any extension beyond the case of 
migrant workers. In this instance, too, one should be 
skeptical of the analogy with the continuous expansion of 
national social security systems to cover ever broader groups 
of the population. Given the progressive loss of control over 
economic policy implied by economic and monetary union, 
social policy is, with foreign policy, one of the few 
remaining bulwarks of national sovereignty, and for this 
reason alone national governments will do their best to 
protect it.
Regional policy remains to be considered. Demands for 
regional redistribution within the EC have become pressing in 
recent years (Marks, 1992; Armstrong,1989; Wallace, 1983), 
leading to a doubling in the expenditure of the structural 
funds - the European Social Fund and the European Fund for 
Regional Development - by 1992. This important growth in 
resources allocated to the poorer areas of the Community 
shows that regional disparities are increasingly seen as a 
serious barrier to further integration. Also, the recent 
reforms in structural policy have created new possibilities 




























































































in individual regions. Proponents of a "Europe of the 
regions" are eager to exploit these possibilities to 
implement their vision of a new European order in which 
increasing centralization of decisionmaking in Brussels is 
counterbalanced by the emergence of powerful regional 
institutions directly linked to the centre (Marks, 1992; 
Majone, 1990).
Despite these interesting political perspectives, 
regional redistribution must be considered a rather 
inefficient instrument of social policy. In their enthusiasm 
for "social cohesion", EC policymakers often seem to forget 
that there is an important distinction between reducing 
inequality among individuals and reducing disparities across 
regions. The problems of targeting regions to achieve a 
better individual state of distribution are well known 
(Musgrave and Musgrave, 1973). Since most regions contain a 
mix of poor and rich individuals, a programme aimed at 
redistributing resources to a region whose average income is 
low may simply result in a lowering of the tax rate. The main 
beneficiaries of the programme will thus be rich individuals 
within poor regions —  a phenomenon well-known in the Italian 
Mezzogiorno and which may be replicated in other regions of 
the Community as a result of the increases in the regional 
funds.
On the other hand, it is politically difficult to aim 




























































































federal system. Even in the United States, where the federal 
government pays three-fourths of the cost of welfare 
assistance, the states set the benefit levels. States differ 
in their assessment of what a family needs to meet a 
reasonable standard of living, and in the percentage of that 
standard they are willing to pay to help that family meet its 
needs. States also differ in the requirements an applicant 
must satisfy in order to be eligible for welfare assistance. 
It was already mentioned that, as a consequence of these 
differences, the level of welfare assistance among the 
American states varies widely, more so than interstate 
disparities in wage rates or cost of living. Similarly in 
Europe, the governments of the countries of the southern 
periphery, foremost among them Spain, are at present 
advocating non-individualised transfers of Community funds.
In sum, it is difficult to see how a coherent and 
effective European social policy could emerge from such 
disparate elements as benefits for farmers, a social security 
regime for migrant workers, and some regional redistribution. 
The social dimension of European integration must mean 
something else.
4. The widening and deepening of social regulation
As we have seen, each successive revision of the Rome Treaty 




























































































Community in social regulation. The SEA provided an explicit 
legal basis for environmental protection, and established the 
principle that environmental protection requirements shall be 
a component of the Community's other policies (Art. 130r(2)). 
It also introduced the principle of qualified majority voting 
for occupational health and safety, and the notion of 
"working environment" which opens up the possibility of 
regulatory intervention in areas such as human-factors 
engineering (ergonomics), traditionally outside health and 
safety regulation. Finally, Art. 100a(3) of the SEA urges the 
Commission to take a high level of protection as a base in 
its proposals relating to health, safety, environmental 
protection and consumer protection. The Treaty of Maastricht 
continues this development by establishing consumer 
protection as a Community policy, defining a role for the 
Community in public health, especially in research and 
prevention (Title XV), and introducing qualified majority 
voting for most environmental legislation.
Even more indicative of the continuous growth of 
Community regulation is the fact that policies were developed 
prior to the existence of a clear legal basis. Thus, three 
Environment Action Programmes were approved before passage of 
the SEA. If it is true that the first Action Programme (1973- 
1976) lacked definite proposals, concentrating instead on 
general principles, subsequent documents became increasingly 




























































































main areas of intervention, while the third (1982-1986) 
stressed the importance of environmental impact assessments 
and of economic instruments for implementation of the 
polluter-pays-principle. Concrete actions followed. The 
number of environmental directives/decisions grew from 10 in 
1975, to 13 in 1980, 20 in 1982, 23 in 1984, 24 in 1985, and 
17 in the six months immediately preceding passage of the 
SEA.
Quantitative growth has been even more impressive in 
other areas of social regulation. For example, by the end of 
1989 the Council had approved 215 directives concerning the 
quality, safety and packaging of goods, and more than 100 
directives adapting technical standards. Scores of directives 
regulating the use of food additives, the naming and 
composition of food products, and the composition of 
materials and products likely to come into contact with 
foodstuffs were introduced in the same period.
More important than this quantitative expansion of 
Community regulation, however, has been its qualitative 
deepening. It is not possible to discuss here those advances 
made on so many fronts since the SEA, but a few examples will 
give an idea of the recent qualitative changes in EC 
regulatory policymaking.
1. Measures concerning health, safety, environmental




























































































justified exclusively in terms of the free movement of 
goods and the completion of the internal market. Social 
regulation is still far from possessing the same 
political and institutional significance as, for 
example, competition policy, but it no longer occupies 
a peripheral position in European policymaking.
2. Less than ten years ago, two distinguished scholars
described the environmental law of the Community as "no 
more than a kind of regulatory patchwork" (Rehbinder and 
Stewart, 1985: 203). To some extent this is still true, 
but in all areas of social regulation one can observe 
increasing efforts to produce comprehensive and coherent 
regulations by means of framework directives. Notable 
recent examples are the new directive on general product 
safety (COM (92) 267), the Safety and Health at Work
Directive (89/391/EEC) and the Machinery Directive 
(89/392/EEC). I shall have more to say about the last 
two directives under point 5.
3. There are signs of a new willingness on the part of the 
Community institutions and the Member States to address 
the issue of implementation (House of Lords Select 
Committee, 1992). This issue, which is especially 
important for social regulation, was given a high 




























































































Council at its meeting in Dublin in June 1990. The 
Council, realizing that the credibility of Community 
policymaking was at stake, asked for periodic 
evaluations of existing directives to ensure that they 
are adapted to scientific and technical progress, and to 
resolve persistent implementation problems.
In October 1991 the Council of Environmental Ministers 
held an informal meeting on implementation, as a result 
of which the Commission was instructed to submit 
proposals concerning the further development of policy 
on compliance and enforcement. At the Maastricht summit 
the Member States again again the need for Community 
legislation to be accurately transposed into national 
law and effectively applied, while the Treaty on 
European Union (Maastricht Treaty) contains new powers 
for the European Court of Justice under which it may 
fine Member States who fail to comply with the judgments 
of the Court.
4. Concerns about implementation and a growing realization 
that "science and technology are advancing at such a 
rate that the Commission, with its current resources, 
cannot possibly keep up with collecting and objectively 
analysing all the new data available ... in order to 
identify new dangers and then to decide whether new 




























































































revived interest in European regulatory agencies and 
inspectorates. A European Environmental Agency was 
established by Council Regulation No.1210/90 of 7 M&y 
1990. A proposal for the establishment of a European 
Agency for Evaluation of Medicinal Products was 
submitted by the Commission on 14 November, 1990 (COM
(90) 283 final), and amended on 12 November 1991 (COM
(91) 382 final). The proposal has not yet been accepted 
by the Council. Also under discussion is another 
proposal made by the Commission on 25 September 1991 for 
a European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (COM 
(90) 564 final).
The creation of European agencies faces not only legal 
problems concerning the separation of powers and the 
delegation of legislative powers in the Community 
(Lenaerts, 1992), but also the opposition of some Member 
States. This explains why the tasks of the European 
Environmental Agency - the only one so far to be 
formally approved by the Council so far - are 
essentially limited to research and data collection. 
However, knowledgeable observers inside and outside 
Community institutions, believe this to be only a first 
step in the direction of a fully-fledged regulatory 
agency. Suggestions have already been made that the 
agency could monitor compliance and the effectiveness of 




























































































also examine the extent to which directives have in fact 
resulted in substantive environmental improvements 
(House of Lords Select Committee, 1992:19).
5. Perhaps the most surprising qualitative change
surprising because it so clearly contradicts the 
received view of EC policymaking - is the innovative 
character of some recent policies. It used to be said 
that EC regulations, in order to be accepted by the 
Member States, had to represent a form of lowest common 
denominator solution. The fact that national interests 
are strongly represented at each stage of Community 
policymaking seemed to preclude the possibility of 
innovation, while giving a bargaining advantage those 
Member States which oppose high levels of protection 
(Dehousse, 1992). At best, the Community could hope "to 
generalize and diffuse solutions adopted in one or more 
Member States by introducing them throughout the 
Community. The solutions of these Member States normally 
set the framework for the Community solution" (Rehbinder 
and Stewart, 1985: 213).
There were in fact exceptions even prior to the SEA. By 
admission of these same authors, some earlier environmental 
directives represented significant policy innovations. Thus 




























































































Member State regulations", while the Directive on sulphur 
dioxide limit values (80/779/EEC) established, on a 
Community-wide basis, ambient air quality standards, which 
most Member States did not previously employ as a control 
strategy (ib.:214).
However, the most striking examples of regulatory 
innovation were made possible by the SEA, in particular by 
the introduction of qualified majority voting not only for 
internal market legislation but also for key areas of social 
regulation. Leaving aside important cases of economic 
regulation like the second banking directive as being outside 
the scope of this paper, I shall briefly return to two 
framework directives mentioned above, see point 2. In many of 
its provisions, Directive 89/391 on health and safety at work 
goes beyond the regulatory philosophy and practice even of 
advanced Member States like Germany (Feldhoff, 1992). Only a 
careful reading of the full text can convey an adequate 
impression of the many elements of novelty introduced by the 
directive. By way of example, I shall only mention some of 
the general obligations imposed on employers by Article 6:
- adapting the work to the individual, especially as 
regards the design of work places, the choice of 
work equipment and the choice of working and 
production methods, with a view in particular to 




























































































predetermined work-rate and to reduce their effect 
on health (Art.6(2)(d));
developing a coherent overall prevention policy 
which covers technology, organization of work, 
working conditions, social relationships and the 
influence of factors related to the working 
environment (Art.6(2)(g));
giving collective protective measures priority 
over individual protective measures (Art.6(2)(h) ) ; 
giving appropriate instructions to the workers 
(Art.6(2)(i)).
Other notable features of the directive are its scope 
(it applies to all sectors of activity, both public and 
private, including service, educational, cultural and leisure 
activities), its requirements concerning worker information, 
and the emphasis on participation and training of workers.
Equally innovative are the Machinery Directive 
(89/392/EEC) and, in a more limited sphere, Directive 90/270 
on health and safety for work with display screen equipment. 
Both directives rely on the concept of "working environment", 
and consider psychological factors like stress and fatigue 
important elements to be considered in a modern regulatory 
approach. It is difficult to find equally advanced principles 
in the legislation of any major industrialized country, 
inside or outside the EC. In order to explain such policy 



























































































process in the Community. The new theories must include 
detailed models of the Commission as an actor enjoying more 
autonomy and discretion than has been assumed so far.
5. Conclusion: which social policy for the EC?
The "big trade-off" between economic efficiency and a more 
equal distribution of income and wealth has confronted every 
democracy since the dawn of industrialization. Today's social 
policies are the outcome of the struggles of the past over 
the division of the domestic product. Because those struggles 
have taken different forms in different countries, social 
policies differ widely even when they appear to use the same 
instruments and institutional arrangements. Moreover, the 
delicate value judgements about the appropriate balance of 
efficiency and equity which social policies express, can only 
be made legitimately and efficiently within homogeneous 
communities. The principle of subsidiarity, if it has any 
meaning, must imply that distributional decisions should be 
taken at national or even subnational level.
For these and the other reasons discussed in the 
preceding pages, a European welfare state seems undesirable 
as well as politically infeasible. Some will see in this 
conclusion another reason for castigating the insufficient 
democratic legitimation of the Community. I submit that this 





























































































relations. Even in national societies, traditional cleavages 
along class, party or religious lines are becoming less 
significant than new "transversal" divisions over cultural 
diversity, citizen participation, the environment, the risks 
of modern technology, and other quality-of-life issues.
It is a fact of great significance that for many of 
these issues the national dimension is essentially 
irrelevant: solutions must be found either at a local or at 
a supranational, even global, level. There is, in other 
words, a natural division of labour between local, national, 
Community and international institutions. The nature of the 
problem, rather than ideological preconceptions or historical 
analogies, should determine the level at which solutions are 
to be sought.
It is certainly true that the creation of a "common 
market" is not a goal capable of eliciting the loyalty and 
attachment of the people of Europe to their supranational 
institutions. A social dimension is also needed, but one must 
be clear about the meaning of this ambiguous expression. As 
I have tried to show, the European Community, rather than 
undermining the achievements of the welfare state, is in fact 
addressing many quality-of-life issues which traditional 
social policies have neglected —  consumer protection and 
equal treatment for men and women, for example. The evidence 
I have presented strongly suggests that the "Social Europe" 




























































































emerge clearly from the jurisprudence of the Court of 
Justice, from the European Single Act and from the Treaty of 
Maastricht, as well as from the pattern of Community 
policymaking —  will be, not a supranational welfare state, 
but an increasingly rich space of social-regulatory policies 
and institutions.
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